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Abstract: 
The  objective  of  this  paper  is  to  bring  elements  from  the  philosophical  movement  of 
hermeneutics  and  pragmatism  to  the  discussion  on  methodology  in  economics,  with  a 
specific  concern  on  the  theory  of  truth.    Our  aim  is  to  present  the  concept  of  the 
hermeneutic space, developed by the philosopher Richard Rorty, as a rational justification 
for  pluralism  in  economics.  We  consider  the  hermeneutic  space  an  interesting  concept 
which  should  allow  us  to  overcome  the  void  left  by  the  incapacity  of  epistemological 
theories to explain the evolution of sciences. It defends the idea that our culture, values and 
ways of interpreting things are what build the sciences, not any closed epistemological 
method. In this sense, pluralism is nothing more than letting the hermeneutic space work, 
without  epistemological  barriers,  and  understanding  that  this  is  desirable  for  the  future 
development  of  economics  as  a  science.  This  approach  differs  from  all  other 
methodological justifications for pluralism because it does not rely on any epistemological 
method, but assumes that the hermeneutic space can entirely fulfill the gap created by them.  
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“Take care of freedom and truth will take 
care of itself” (Richard Rorty 2006). 
 
1. Introduction 
Several economists have been discussing the role of pluralism in economics in the last few 
years (Sent (2005), Garnett (2003), Davis  (2003),  Warren (1997),  Fernández & Pessali 
(2001),  Bianchi  (1992),  Chick  (2004),  and  Dow  (1990,  2005).  Dow  (1990)  bases  this 
growing interest of the academic world in themes related to the methodology of science 
partly on the observation that the mainstream is going through an important methodological 
crisis.  She  presents  and  criticizes  the  concept  of  dualism  behind  orthodox  thinking  in 
contrast with the “Babylonian” way of thinking. Dualism is defined as: “…the practice of 
organizing thought by means of all-encompassing mutually-exclusive categories, with fixed 
meanings” (1990, p. 143). The dualist way of thinking has been embedded in the western 
culture and civilization since the Platonic tradition, which was the first one to separate mind 
and matter. The Platonic tradition’s defining characteristic is the categorization by means of 
binary concepts - x and non-x, which excludes any intermediate existence between the two 
alternatives. 
As Dow points out, economic analysis may be understood in terms of a hierarchization, 
ranging  from the most concrete level – concerned with the prescription of policies - to the 
most abstract level – which makes it necessary to reflect on the theoretical, methodological, 
and, at last, the way of thinking that lies beneath the methodology adopted. In order to 
allow for the study of a highly complex and dynamic social reality, the dualist way of 
thinking seems to be poor and incomplete, as there exist infinite shades of colors in the 
specter of economic analysis. As Dow points out, the orthodox dualist way of studying 
economic phenomena– which may also be qualified as Cartesian/Euclidean –, is behind the 
current methodological crisis in mainstream economics. 
The need and virtues of a pluralist perspective are highlighted from such perspective: “The 
aim  of  [a  pluralist]  study  would  then  be  to  ensure  that  each  of  the  various  possible 
methodologies  is  consistent  by  its  own  criteria,  and  to  promote  mutual  understanding 
among practitioners of different methodologies; such understanding provides a basis not 




155). Samuels (1997), who also advocates methodological pluralism, bases his analysis on 
the observation that there is no conclusive methodological/epistemological principle that 
allows an objective selection between different theories. There is no meta-principle that 
guides the selection between theoretical bodies equally provided with internal limitations, 
which in his view makes the choice of one over the other dependent on other exogenous 
social  criteria.  Our  definitions  of  economic  reality,  as  well  as  economic  theories  and 
methodologies, are socially built; they are made, rather than discovered. 
In agreement with such perspectives, and in an attempt to contribute to the debate, our 
proposal in this article is to carry out a study on neopragmatism and hermeneutics and its 
possible influence on the methodological discussion of pluralism in economics. The main 
focus of our work is the connection between pluralism and the concept of the hermeneutic 
space  as  defined  by  Richard  Rorty’s  neopragmatism.  Our  broader  goal  is  to  present  a 
philosophical  perspective  that  allows  us  to  gain  a  better  understanding  of  the  pluralist 
movement in general and its application to economics in specific. To this end, in section 
two  of  the  paper  we  present  the  discussions  that  brought  us  “from  epistemology  to 
hermeneutics”.  In  section  three  and  four,  we  discuss  Rorty´s  neopragmatism  and  the 
importance of the “hermeneutic space” for the progress of science and the possible lessons 
to the practice of economics. Concluding our work we discuss the feasibility and relevance 
of the hermeneutic, pragmatic, and pluralist perspectives for the methodological discussion 
in economics. 
 
2. From epistemology to hermeneutics 
Based on the work of Rorty (1994a), the history of philosophy of science in the 20
th century 
- from its beginnings with logical positivism, to more recent discussions on the role of 
rhetoric,  hermeneutics,  and  pragmatism  -  may  be  seen  as  a  path  that  starts  with  the 
epistemological debate on the positivist criteria of scientific demarcation and ends with 
more open and discursive ways in which sciences are seen. On the way, epistemology 
begins to be put aside in favor of a more interpretative approach. One may understand such 




increasingly  acknowledges  that  there  is  no  precise  and  “correct”  way  of  reaching  the 
“truth”.  
This  first  section  of  our  paper  examines  this  opening  of  the  philosophy  of  science, 
presenting hermeneutics based on the ideas of the  philosopher Richard Rorty as one of the 
latest stages in such development. As will be discussed later, Rorty ends up abandoning 
epistemology after he understands that the search for proper methods to reach the “truth” is 
wrong a priori. However, before going deeper into Rorty’s ideas, it is important to present 
a brief summary of the main contributions of philosophy of science in the 20
th century, 
showing why and how, according to Rorty and to us, this discipline has been proposing a 
change from epistemology to hermeneutics. 
In Rudolf Carnap's logical positivism of the beginning of 20
th the century, there are only 
two types of genuine knowledge: the analytical one, such as mathematics and logics, which 
is true in any world, and the empirical one, which is synthetic and true only under certain 
circumstances. Nonetheless, in addition to proposing this division between what is  and 
what is not valid knowledge, logical positivism also defined what would be the proper 
manner to “make” science (its demarcation criterion). According to logical positivists, ideas 
start in sentences about phenomena that can be observed and which, through induction, can 
be generalized to scientific theories. Thus, scientific theories should be purely descriptive, 
without trying to go beyond empirical observations (Hands, 2001). In addition, it should be 
possible to translate them back as observable sentences without loss of meaning. That is, 
scientific theories would be no more than descriptions of empirical observations expressed 
in a specific language (the mathematical language, specific to sciences).  
The logic positivism of the beginning of the 20
th century corresponds therefore to one of the 
closest contemporary forms of science, for it does not even acknowledge the descriptive 
value of the various historical experiences that gave content and social meaning to the 
scientific practices over the centuries. It simply ignores such discussion which would take 
us to acknowledge the plurality of methods used during the history of scientific thought. It 
understands that the “truth” should be searched in a unilateral and positive way, a content to 
be discovered and revealed by means of a method that is privileged, unique, and capable of 




The  ideas  presented  by  Popper  are  a  step  ahead  in  terms  of  epistemological  opening 
compared to logical positivism. Popper at least acknowledges that there is no privileged 
way to reach the “truth”, since the description of reality itself results in Hume's induction 
problem. He argues that there is no way to logically justify a generalization from specific 
observations, a problem which logical positivism never really resolved. However, despite 
acknowledging that there is no method capable of taking theories to the truth, Popper still 
presents  an  argumentative  structure  with  a  demarcating  nature,  typical  of  the 
epistemological approach. He proposes the existence of at least one method to reject them, 
as for him it is possible to tell the difference between theories “closest to the truth”, the 
ones which were not proven wrong yet, and the most distant ones, those which were proven 
wrong by an empirical test. 
Popper’s demarcation method stems from the claim that science should work according to 
the modus tollens logic, which tries to prove theories logically wrong instead of confirming 
them. Thus, a theory is scientific if it generates forecasts which can potentially be proven 
wrong. And in case two theories have gone through the same tests and survived, the one 
which generates the highest amount of forecasts that can be proven wrong is to be chosen, 
for that is the one with more empirical content (Popper, 1934). However, the Popperian 
logic still has its own limitations regarding the epistemological treatment of sciences, since 
falsifiability is still understood as the most appropriate method for getting a theory closer to 
the truth, (a model regarded as an epistemological ideal for choosing between scientific 
theories), but which does not care enough about the way through which the sciences are 
actually built. 
Nevertheless, the problem is that even being an ideal selection criterion, Popper's method 
still seems rationally incomplete, as it does not overcome the logical problems of pure 
empiricism. Indeed, for Popper, the difficulty of tearing the empirical content of a theory 
apart from its purely theoretical elements through a scientific test is firmly maintained. This 
in turn makes the so called crucial experiment difficult since the theories, upon verification, 
are used in its entirety which leaves it open a priori which part of the chain was effectively 




The fact that you don’t know which part of the theory was proven wrong was one of the 
fundamental problems which took Willard Quine to defend the logical impracticability of 
separating analytical from synthetic knowledge. In practical terms it is thus difficult to 
maintain that a theory should be rejected by whatever empirical criterion. It will always be 
possible to logically recover the non-empirical content of a theory, revising it and saving it 
from a possible rejection. As such, the use of ad hoc hypotheses shall always remain a 
difficulty for the idealist pretensions of the Popperian epistemology. 
In “The two dogmas of empirism”, Quine argues against the opposition of analytical and 
synthetic knowledge and the belief that each significant empirical preposition is equivalent 
to some logical construct that refers to immediate experience (reductionism), thus braking 
up the possibility of building  crucial experiments. “Both dogmas, I shall argue, are ill 
founded. One effect of abandoning them is, as we shall see, a blurring of the supposed 
boundary between speculative metaphysics and natural science. Another effect is a shift 
toward pragmatism” (Quine, 1951, p.20). In face of facts that reject a certain theory, the 
inner reformulation of the main or secondary hypotheses of the model (seen in the positivist 
universe as analytical knowledge, not subject to being proven wrong) or changes in the 
ceteris paribus conditions of the empirical test may always save the theory at hand. There 
is, therefore, an underdetermination problem in empirical tests. It is always possible to 
claim that the empirical results were not good, as an alternative ceteribus paribus condition 
was not considered.  
Another problem which came to be known in the literature as the Duhem-Quine thesis 
refers to the problem that the data are always embedded in theory. An empirical test shall 
always depend on a set of theoretical considerations and definitions. It is these theoretical-
empirical packages (Quine’s force-field) that are tested in practice. That being the case, the 
scientist’s lack of resources to definitively reject different concepts and theories about his 
object of study and thus represent “reality” in a unique fashion becomes evident. 
And it is with reference to such problems in science that Thomas Kuhn, one of the greatest 
philosophers of science of the 20
th century, presents his understanding of the evolution of 
scientific knowledge based on the concept of “paradigm”. Paradigms correspond to the 




practices  and  about  the  forms  and  methodologies  used  when  building  its  theories. 
According to Kuhn, the various sciences evolve through paradigm shifts. In periods of 
normal science, scientists dedicate their time to develop theories based on their current 
paradigm, whereas in renewal periods or in “scientific revolutions” a certain set of concepts 
and methodologies are no longer able to explain their object of study and a new set of ideas, 
a new paradigm starts to emerge. Thus, the evolution of science takes place not only in the 
periods of normal science, but mostly in periods of revolutions. Such periods are needed 
and  inevitable  for  new  ideas,  alien  to  the  common  understanding  of  scientists,  to  start 
defining the development of theories (Kuhn 1962).  
One of  Kuhn’s  crucial ideas is that beliefs are  essential in building paradigms. Beliefs 
define the way in which a certain scientific group understands and develops its object of 
study. As such, beliefs inevitably end up being incorporated in the development of science.  
Thus, through his emphasis on the role of beliefs and individual values for the evolution of 
science  and  the  search  for  “truth”,  Kuhn  is  one  step  ahead  of  his  predecessors,  as  he 
acknowledges that there is no non-valuing and pure way of building science.  
The Kuhnian way of thinking already points to an opening of philosophy science towards 
hermeneutics.  The  comprehension  that  sciences  are built from  the  consensuses  of  their 
scientific communities opens the field for discussion of how such consensuses are reached. 
Kuhn points to the importance of language in such process, however he does not discuss 
the role of rhetoric and hermeneutics as it is done by, among others, authors such as D. 
McCloskey (1998) and R. Rorty (1994a). Generally speaking, the understanding of these 
authors is that given the non-existence of a proper way to reach scientific “truths” and the 
fact that the evolution of sciences takes place by means of a collective construction process, 
the ways of building, transmitting and interpreting knowledge play an essential role in this 
process.  In  this  view,  science  evolves  through  discussions  and  debate,  and  thus 
hermeneutics and rhetoric become extremely important. 
 
3. Rorty´s neopragmatism 
Rorty’s  philosophical  project  unites  the  criticism  to  rationalism  typical  of  the  pioneer 




philosophy of language which came after them. Or, put another way, it attempts to present 
philosophy as a dynamic activity that tries to free us from the epistemological and positivist 
impositions of the Cartesian and Kantian traditions, without losing the dimension and critic 
function  of  philosophy  regarding  language  (typical  of  the  Anglo-American  tradition  in 
analytical  philosophy).  At  the  same  time,  he  tries  to  preserve  philosophy’s  creative 
dimension  and  advance  in  a  hermeneutical  dimension  that  does  not  allow  itself  to  get 
involved  in  epistemological  determinisms,  which  try  to  limit  the  field  of  action  of 
knowledge (such as the ones practiced, for example, by the logic empirism and by Popper’s 
falseability). 
For Rorty, the objective of knowledge should be the creative search for the resolution of 
new problems that are now more important to us than those that were resolved in the past. 
Philosophy has an enormous creative potential (which many times is put to waste) to grant 
us  conditions  to  rebuild  our trajectories alongside  our  objectives  and  using  a  scientific 
knowledge which is in accordance with a practical and human spirit, targeted at the “world 
of life”, in the same style as the philosophy of William James and Friedrich Nietzsche. 
According to Rorty, we should search in philosophy and in science, as well as in any other 
areas of human knowledge, for new ways of thinking about problems which arise more and 
more dynamically in our societies. 
Just  as  Quine  started  a  “new  age”  for  pragmatism  inside  the  American  philosophical 
thinking, Richard Rorty initiated, in the eighties, a process to rebuild (from Quine) the 
pragmatist philosophy in a version more oriented towards the pragmatist presuppositions 
and values present in the philosophy of William James and John Dewey. Richard Rorty’s 
philosophical project is closer to the tradition started by W. Quine but at the same time it 
attempts  to  base  pragmatism  in  a  view  that  is  ethical  and  based  on  the  principle  of 
democracy. The difference lies in the reading and in the level of proximity or distance that 
both have from the tradition of analytical philosophy and the empiricism of the first half of 
the  20
th  century.  To  that  matter,  Rorty  is  antagonistic  in  relation  to  the  pragmatist, 
epistemological  proposals  of  Quine  and  Peirce.  He  is  part  of  a  new  generation  of 
philosophers that understand that philosophy and scientific knowledge shall be targeted to 
life and to the search for the solution of concrete problems, rather than to the “Truth” which 




According to Rorty, it makes no sense to assume that knowledge may be reached by means 
of empirical or rational validation methods, which could provide us with evidences for 
representational  judgments  that  are  not  normative  or  practical  in  nature.  Such  neutral 
representational  judgments  do  not  exist.  For  neopragmatists  such  as  Rorty,  the 
uninterrupted search for the “Truth” already seems a choice filled with judgments on value 
and,  therefore,  full  of  valuing  implications  related  to  the  support  of  a  platonic  ideal. 
Inspired in Nietzsche and William James, Rorty makes us question the practical relevance 
of searching alleged “Truths”, understood in the essentialistic or semantic-representational 
sense. That is, he makes us ask ourselves about the following question in a Nietzschian 
fashion: “Why always the Truth?” Based on what is it possible to affirm that searching the 
transcendental truth is something important and relevant and which shall have a priority 
over  our  “mundane”  goals?  What  is  the  relevance  of  assuming  the  existence  of  an 
immutable and definitive essence of processes and things? 
Science and philosophy shall attempt to solve the new problems that arise in each specific 
field and specific society, instead of wasting time with endless debates on what the “Truth” 
is or what is the essence that supposedly would calm our intellectual and philosophical 
concerns. The rotation between theories and scientific verification methods observed along 
the history of the scientific thinking would be, according to Rorty, much less related to 
mistakes or deviations to the epistemological path pointed out by our philosophers than the 
alleged changes to the theoretical and applied problems that arise in our societies as they 
change, creating and recreating new problems. The interesting thing is, according to such 
perspective, that the creation of theoretical problems itself may be regarded as part of the 
historical and contingent conditions present in a certain moment, thus escaping from an 
ethnocentrism that is so typical of traditional philosophers and methodologists. 
To that extent, science may not be seen as being independent of the culture and goals of 
society. That becomes even clearer when one works with sciences regarded as human, for, 
in such cases, the consequences of the attitude of having dominion over human actions 
have ethical-social implications that are even more contestable. According to the pragmatist 
view derived from Richard Rorty's thinking, there is no a priori philosophical condition 
that allows us to consider a problem epistemologically more relevant than other, whether or 




cultural values. There is no choice that is positive, neutral, or made in an uninterested way. 
Every choice that claims to be uninterested is based on a judgment about value. That is one 
of the main signs of the neopragmatic tradition as presented by Rorty.  
 
4. The hermeneutic space 
Hermeneutics or the study of interpretation and explanation has its origins in the studies of 
biblical interpretation, law and jurisprudence. In the 20th century, some authors expanded 
its boundaries to the study of the social sciences and social phenomena. Authors such as 
Hans G. Gadamer, Karl O. Apel, J. Habermas and Paul Ricouer, among others, helped 
shaping  new  strands  in  the  methodological  and  philosophical  debate  in  social  sciences 
where hermeneutics plays a central role. Richard Rorty discusses through his work the role 
of  hermeneutics  in  the  way  sciences  evolve.  According  to  him,  hermeneutics  is  not  a 
replacement for epistemology; it is not a new theoretical foundation capable of explaining 
the way science is built. Where epistemology and all of its theories have failed to show how 
science really evolves and how we should proceed to find “truth”, hermeneutics comes as 
an appeal to leave that space open.  
According to Rorty’s ideas, all epistemological theories are commensurable, i.e. they are 
composed of a series of rational rules which allow the creation of sciences from historically 
defined standards. Following that line of thought, it is not possible to abandon the search 
for commensurability and rational conversation, but that does not mean that epistemology 
is the means to do it as many have done along history. Another option would be to search 
for a way to understand the evolution of sciences and the way in which scientists think and 
actually perform science. Despite the knowledge that a single method cannot be found, the 
search for the way science works remains extremely important for it contributes to the 
pragmatic understanding of the world we live in. That is why Rorty presents hermeneutics, 
and more specifically the hermeneutic space, as the way through which we may understand 
the evolution of sciences, i.e. the way through which scientists build science. 
According to Rorty, a philosopher may play two roles. First, that of an interlocutor between 
different discourses, similar to a link between separate chains which unites and assigns 




is the one who knows the substratum that is common to all scientists; he knows what all of 
them do - even if they themselves do not  - because he knows the foundation with which 
they do it (whether such foundation is the mind, the language, or any other philosophical 
entity which supposedly is universal). 
The first of such roles relates to hermeneutics; the second one to epistemology. But, as we 
said before, there is no way to reach this so-called “common substratum” of all discourses, 
not because we lack the means to do so, but because such substratum simply does not exist. 
Such  chimerical  entity  assumes  that  the  objects  and  problems  being  investigated  are 
perennial,  which  is  not  true,  even  when  it  comes  to  natural  sciences.  It  is  necessary, 
therefore,  to  adopt  a  new  instrument  to  scan  science,  one  which  lacks  the  vices  that 
corrupted the previous one. 
And that is the proposal of hermeneutics. Not a new instrument per se, but a new way or 
approach  of  viewing  the  world,  which  ceases  to  require  the  existence  of  a  common 
substratum and abandons the hope that there is a commensurability between all discourses. 
The only thing that hermeneutics proposes is the continuation of the debate, for it is this 
that allows for the hope of consensus to survive. “Epistemology views the participants [of 
science] united in what Oakeshott calls an Universitas – a group united by mutual interests 
in achieving a common end. Hermeneutics views them as united in what he calls a societas 
– persons whose paths through life have fallen together, united by civility rather than by a 
common goal, much less by a common ground” (Rorty, 1994, p. 318). 
The practical approach suggested by epistemology indicated that the discourses should be 
separated  into  commensurable  and  incommensurable,  as  “normal”  and  “abnormal” 
discourses.  In  the  sense  Kuhn  tried  to  use  such  terms,  we  could  identify  the  normal, 
commensurable discourse with the practice of normal science (intraparadigmatic) and the 
abnormal discourse with the ruptures and scientific revolutions. The “abnormal” discourse 
could be seen as meaningless and useless – without scientific relevance – the reason for 
which epistemology always refrained from associating itself to it. Hermeneutics attempts to 
understand such abnormality, even if from the point of view of a “normal” discourse. As 
such, it is the search for meaning in a language that we are not capable of describing yet 




To that extent, the division created here between the normal and the abnormal discourse - 
or objective and subjective - is not other than the familiarity one. As stated by Rorty, “We 
must  be  hermeneutical  where  we  do  not understand  what  is  happening  but  are  honest 
enough to admit it” (Rorty, 1994, p. 321).  
Epistemology attempts to access the objective and uninterested representation of an alleged 
“universal truth”. But instead, what philosophy of science really needs is to acknowledge 
that science, in whatever field, is a path of values. There is no way to objectively represent 
the “universal truth”; there is no “universal truth”. Every object of study is the result of 
human deliberation, based on values. Our culture and the way through which we interpret 
things are actually what build theories.  
 
4. Conclusions 
D. McCloskey’s emphasis on rhetoric in economics, as well as her criticism of the criterion 
for demarcation and the semantic concept of “Truth” is closely connected to the influence 
of  Richard  Rorty’s  neopragmatism  (see  Rego,  1996).  According  to  McCloskey,  such 
influence arises exactly at the moment in which the empiric tradition of epistemology - 
Popper's falseability perspective included - seems to follow a path of no return towards a 
full disconnection from scientific practice regarding the epistemological standards and rules 
defended by the philosophers of science. Right now, an epistemological abyss seems to 
exist between the scientific practice and the philosophy of science. In this vein, Lisboa 
(2001)  states  that  the  philosophy  of  science  is  currently  facing  a  dilemma:  “absolute 
skepticism or the use of some pre-existing understanding of the world which rejects the 
need for validation through experience and which, in such case, can not be set apart from 
the understanding proposed by any theological argument” (Lisboa, 2001, p. 808). 
McCloskey, in contrast to Lisboa and other neoclassical economists who follow the empiric 
tradition, tries to resolve such issues of the official economic methodology not using an 
empiric resource as the last salvation to define an epistemological criterion. She proposes, 
rather,  seeking  to  better  understand  and  reflect  pragmatically  on  the  philosophical 
assumptions  that  for  centuries  supported  the  belief  of  the  illuminist  tradition  that  the 




Therefore, McCloskey follows Rorty when he fundamentally questions the ultimate need 
for the existence of any epistemological resource for the scientific practice in economy. He 
claims the irrelevance and apparent nonsense of demarcation attitudes that may serve as 
instruments  capable  of  generating  a  philosophical  or  epistemological  control  upon  the 
effective practice of economic science. 
This opens the following question: what is the role for the epistemological demarcation 
criterion for the production of scientific knowledge? Following Rorty and McCloskey, we 
would argue that the answer is “none”. Because all epistemological criterion, to that extent, 
use a semantic conception of truth that favors the assumption of the existence of an essence 
to things (“Truth”) regardless of any linguistic, cultural or historical context. The relevance 
of philosophy for the scientific practice according to such trend of pragmatist authors is in 
removing epistemological criteria that could represent “authoritarian” instruments seeking 
to “judge” theories.  
The  objective  of  the  pragmatist  criticism  to  epistemology  as  proposed  by  Rorty  and 
McCloskey is to make our choices clearer and prevent them from being camouflaged by 
alleged philosophical exemptions in the name of scientific neutrality and objectiveness. 
According to pragmatism, we can not free ourselves from the responsibility of our own  
choices and points of view of the world, as well as our interests, whether scientific or not. 
That  being  the  case,  there  is  no  way  we  can  defend,  based  on  a  philosophical  or 
epistemological narrative, that our scientific, critical, or religious interests are closer to the 
“Truth” than any other. This is where we see the importance of the non-epistemological, 
democratic and argumentative nature of the economic discourse. The main contribution 
given by the hermeneutical and pragmatic perspectives to the production of knowledge in 
economics  refers  to  the  attempt  they  make  to  resolve  these  inconclusive  and  non-
operational debates regarding epistemological criteria of “Truth” (in which one assumes the 
transcendental superiority of some theoretical or ontological-metaphysical perspective in 
relation to other perspectives).  
Economists seem to be starting to realize that there is no possible closed epistemology. The 
method  that  searches  for  the  best  understanding  of  reality  must  be  a  plural  one.  If 




hermeneutic approach, humbly opening ourselves to the possibility of studying what was 
previously regarded as incommensurable, pluralism becomes an interesting and important 
option  for  economists.  Being  plural  is  being  open  to  deal  with  the  incommensurable, 
“hermeneutics is not ‘another way of knowing’ [...] It is better seen as another way of 
coping” (Rorty, 1994, p. 356).  
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